Supreme Court: Article 39(b) shouldn’t be read like there is no protection for private rights

May 1, 2024
Posted by: OptimizeIAS Team
Category: DPN Topics

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Supreme Court: Article 39(b) shouldn’t be read like there is no protection for private rights

Subject: Polity

Sec: constitution

Tag: Art 39(b), DPSP V/S FR

Context:

A nine-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court, which is examining the question whether private property would constitute material resources of the community as appearing in Article 39(b),said that the provision should not be interpreted in such a wide sense that there is no protection for private rights at all.

More on news:

The reference to the nine-judges had arisen in the context of the two views emerging in the 1978 decision in ‘State of Karnataka And Anr Etc vs Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr’.
In the Golak Nath case (1967), the Supreme Court held that fundamental rights cannot be abridged or diluted to implement DPSP.
Finally, in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), a thirteen-judge Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Article 31C but made it subject to judicial review.
In the Minerva Mills case (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution exists on a harmonious balance between fundamental rights and DPSP.
The Union also proposed to understand the post-Minerva Mills impact on Article 31C from the standpoint of Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory.

What does the Constitution provide?

The Preamble to the Constitution aims to secure to all citizens social and economic justice, liberty and equality.
Part III of the Constitution lists down the fundamental rights that guarantee liberty and equality while Part IV contains the DPSP.
These are principles that the central and State governments should follow to achieve social and economic justice in our country.
Article 39(b) and (c) in Part IV contain principles that are aimed at securing economic justice.
They provide that ownership and control of material resources of the society should be distributed to serve the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in concentration of wealth to the common detriment.

What is the historical context?

The Constitution originally guaranteed the right to property as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f).
It provided under Article 31 that the state shall pay compensation in case of acquisition of private property.

About Right to private property:

In 1978, in order to avoid excessive litigation directly in the Supreme Court by the propertied class, the 44th amendment act omitted the right to property as a fundamental right and made it a constitutional right under Article 300A.
The right to private property continues to be an important constitutional cum legal right.
Any law to acquire private property by the state should be only for a public purpose and provide for adequate compensation.

India’s Economic model:

The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP Act) was brought with the rationale to reduce inequality and redistribute wealth among the poorer sections who constituted the majority of the population.
A new industrial policy was unveiled in July 1991 with the objective of empowering market forces, improving efficiency and rectifying deficiencies in the country’s industrial structure.
The MRTP Act was repealed and replaced with the Competition Act, 2002 and income tax rates were reduced considerably.
Estate duty was abolished in 1985 and wealth tax in 2016.

Constitutional Provisions in news:

Article 39(b) obligates the state to direct its policy towards securing the ownership and control of the material resources of the community that are so distributed as best to subserve the common good.
Article 39(c) of the DPSP states that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
Article 300A required the state to follow due procedure and authority of law to deprive a person of his or her private property.
The right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.

About Material resources of the community:

Material resources of the community in the context of reordering the national economy embraces all the national wealth, not merely natural resources, all the private and public sources of meeting material needs, not merely public possessions.

About Blackstone’s Declaratory Theory:

Main supporters of declaratory theory are Hale, Blackstone and carter.
According to this theory judges only declare law; no new law is created by the judges.
Their province is to ascertain and declare what the law is.
They only discover the existing laws, the particular principles that govern the individual cases.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS	DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES
These are negative as they prohibit the State from doing certain things	These are positive as they require the State to do certain things.
These are justiciable, that is, they are legally enforceable by the courts in case of their violation.	These are non-justiciable, that is, they are not legally enforceable by the courts for their violation
They aim at establishing political democracy in the country	They aim at establishing social and economic democracy in the country.
These have legal sanctions	These have moral and political sanctions
They promote the welfare of the individual	They promote the welfare of the community
They do not require any legislation for their implementation. They are automatically enforced.	They require legislation for their implementation. They are not automatically enforced
The courts are bound to declare a law violative if any of the Fundamental Rights is unconstitutional and invalid	The courts cannot declare a law violative if any of the Directive Principles is unconstitutional and invalid. However, they can uphold the validity of a law on the ground that it was enacted to give effect to a directive
Fundamental Rights are analogous with UNHDR	Directive Principles could be considered analogous to the rights enshrined in the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

STAGE

First Stage:

1950-1966

Directive Principles as subsidiary and subordinate to Fundamental Rights

In case of conflict, FR would prevail over DPSP

Eg :Champakam Dorairajan’s case (Article 29 vs Article 46

The Constitution (First Amendment Act, 1951): Inserted Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution. Article 31A provides that no law providing the acquisition by the State of any estate therein shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provisions of Part III.

31-B, none of the laws specified in the Ninth Schedule shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it was inconsistent with any of the Fundamental Rights, notwithstanding any judgments, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary

Second Stage:

1967-1971

(Fundamental Rights are Sacrosanct)

Golak Nath’s Case: The First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendment abridged the scope of the Fundamental rights and were, therefore, void under Article 13 of the Constitution. Any amendment of Part III could be made only in so far as it did not take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by that part

Third Stage:

1972-1975

Fundamental Rights can be

amended to implement Directive Principles

Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), the Supreme Court declared the above second provision of Article 31C as unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution and hence, cannot be taken away. However, the above first provision of Article 31C was held to be constitutional and valid

Fourth Stage

Fundamental Rights as Subordinate to Directive Principles

42nd Constitutional Amendment Act: The Act inter alia gave preponderance to the Directive Principles of State Policy over the Fundamental Rights. It amended Article 31(c) and fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 were subordinated to all the Directive Principles of State Policy mentioned in Part IV.
It extended the scope of the above first provision of Article 31C by including within its protection any law to implement any of the Directive Principles and not merely those specified in Article 39 (b) and (c)
This was a fundamental change in the Constitution because it has completely changed the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles

Fifth Stage:

1980- Till date

Superiority of Fundamental Rights

In Minerva Mills Case some of the provisions of the 42nd Amendment Act were challenged in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in its judgment struck down section 4 of the 42nd Amendment Act.

Concluding view by Minerva Mills Case

The Supreme Court held that ‘the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles. They together constitute the core of commitment to social revolution. They are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less than the other. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and balance between the two are an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. The goals set out by the Directive Principles have to be achieved without the abrogation of the means provided by the Fundamental Rights’